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Abstract. This article presents a methodology designed to facilitate alternative 
variables measuring economic growth.  A capital-labor split of Cobb-Douglas 
function is adapted for use in the context of economic growth.  A capital/income 
ratio and two fundamental laws of capitalism originated by Thomas Piketty 
illustrate capital inequality undervalued with respect to labor inequality.  In 
addition, the article includes export and external debt as strong alternatives.  
Empirical data of the World Bank are analyzed to demonstrate broad differences 
in economic sizes.  The case analysis on Latin America as an example of 
different sized economy is also discussed. 
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Introduction  
Questions about stability of the capital-labor split 
“ …..in the 2000s several official reports published by the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) took note 
of the phenomenon (a sign that the question was being taken seriously).  The novelty of this 
study is that it is to my knowledge the first attempt to place the question of the capital-labor 
split and the recent increase of capital’s share of national income in a broader historical 
context by focusing on the evolution of the capital/income ratio from the eighteenth century 
until now. ….. ” 
 Ref: Thomas Piketty (2014) Capital in the Twenty-First Century 
 
Until when, can we use the Cobb-Douglas function with the mindset to believe the stability of 
the Capital-Labor split?  A rational answer with alternative solutions should be pursued to 
this question.  At the first step, we may comment on weakness of this method.     
Firstly, the Solow residual which is a number describing empirical productivity growth in 
an economy from year to year and decade to decade is hard to be calculated because of it's 
"residual" which is the part of growth that cannot be explained through capital accumulation 
or the accumulation of other traditional factors, such as land or labor.  
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The equation in Cobb-Douglas form is: Y=A K
 
L

 where total output Y is as a function of 
total-factor productivity A, Capital input K, Labor input L and two input's respective shares of 
output. ( and  are the capital input share of contribution for K and L respectively) 
Even though Robert Solow defined rising productivity as rising output with constant 
capital and labor input perfectly, he left undefined part as the Solow residual. The problem is 
that Solow residual has pro-cyclicality.  Traditionally, total output is measured by inputs of 
labor and capital.  TFP (TFP) called multi-factor productivity (MFP) accounting for all 
inputs cannot be measured directly and accounts for effects in total output not caused by 
inputs.  Indeed, there are two sided directions to analyze the economy.   
Especially, Multifactor Productivity (MFP) is measured as below: 
 
MFPi = Yi - i where Yi denotes actual output and i denotes predicted output    (1a)  
Loge (Y) = 0 + I loge (i) + I loge (Li)                                  (1b) 
So we get, MFP = (ln)/t = (lnY)/t – sL(lnL)/t - sK(lnK)/t where  is the 
global production function: Y is output, t is time, SL is the share of input costs attributable to 
labor expenses, SK is the share of input costs attributable to capital expenses, L is a dollar 
quantity of labor, K is a dollar quantity of capital, M is a dollar quantity of materials, S is a 
dollar quantity of (business) services, E is energy or exergy (available energy), only used in 
some models. 
Secondly, like Total Factor Productivity (TFP), Growth accounting exercises are open to 
the Cambridge Critique.  The aggregation problem is the major part of this debate.  The 
style that the representative agent solves the decision problem in the function assuming the 
entire economy cannot be from the debate about the collection problem of different inputs, 
sudden shocks, rate of profit and a large number of heterogeneous workplaces.  Hence, some 
economists believe that the method and its results are invalid.   
Otherwise, we can indirectly establish the model to find determinants of TFP.  
Neoclassical economics started with the classical factors of production of land, labor and 
capital.  Further distinctions from classical and neoclassical microeconomics include capital-
the result of investment, fixed capital, working capital, financial capital and technological 
progress.  Additionally, entrepreneurship, human capital, intellectual capital, social capital, 
natural resources and energy can be considered. 
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Table 1: Methodology about Factors of Production 
 
Inputs: Three Factors of Production 
Classical economics Adam Smith, David Ricardo: Labor, Capital Stock, Land (Natural 
Resource) 
Marxism Labor, The subject of labor, The instruments of labor 
Neoclassical microeconomics different format: Capital, Fixed Capital, Working Capital, 
Financial Capital, Technological progress 
+add: Entrepreneurs (Frank Knight), Human Capital, Intellectual Capital, Social Capital 
(Pierre Bourdieu), Natural resources (Ayres-Warr), Energy 
Output: Finished Goods (National Income) 
Factor Payments: Rent, Wage, Interest, Profit 
Ref: author, 2014 
 
So we need to think "Weightiness" on Labor, Capital and other factors at the next step.  I 
agree with the opinion of Thomas Piketty that structure of inequality with respect to both 
labor and capital has actually changed since the ninetieth century. 
 “To what extent are inequalities of income from labor moderate, reasonable, or even no 
longer an issue today?  It is true that inequalities with respect to labor are always much 
smaller than inequalities with respect to capital.  It would be quite wrong, however, to 
neglect them, first because income from labor generally accounts for two-thirds to three-
quarters of national income, and second because there are quite substantial differences 
between countries in the distribution of income from labor, which suggests that public 
policies and national differences can have major consequences for these inequalities and for 
the living conditions of large numbers of people.” 
Ref: Thomas Piketty (2014) Capital in the Twenty-First Century 
Dynamics of the capital/income ratio of Thomas Piketty: r > g 
“…If, moreover, the rate of return on capital remains significantly above the growth rate for 
an extended period of time (which is more likely when the growth rate is low, though not 
automatic), then the risk of divergence in the distribution of wealth is very high...” 
“…This fundamental inequality, which I will write as r > g (where r stands for the 
average annual rate of return on capital, including profits, dividends, interest, rents, and other 
income from capital, expressed as a percentage of its total value, and g stands for the rate of 
growth of the economy, that is, the annual increase in income or output), will play a crucial 
role in this book.  In a sense, it sums up the overall logic of  my conclusions.….”  
Ref: Thomas Piketty (2014) Capital in the Twenty-First Century 
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Thomas Piketty put emphasis on capital inequality.  This is the similar viewpoint of boom 
and bust.  Boom and bust are periods of a severe business cycle over time.  Several 
economic indicators are denoted as sustained increases followed by a sharp and rapid 
contraction.  Times of increased business and investment have collapsed leaving widespread 
poverty such as the depression of 1837 and 1857 in the United States.  For example, in the 
early 1800s in Ohio people were buying land on credit to sell at twice the price but land 
became too expensive to buy.  At the same time, wheat prices became too low to transport 
wheat to market.  Wheat was $1.50 per bushel in 1816; by 1821, 20 cents.  The automaker 
Paul Hoffman said “we cannot live with a crash with 26 depressions over 100 years including 
the burst of the 1930s.” 
The dynamics of the capital/income ratio adds a new perspective to the debate on capital 
and wealth.  Previous study provides an overview of economic development.  The direction 
of economic growth rate should increase to the top.  However, the new viewpoint offers an 
alternative framework to demonstrate how the society actually moves.  It examines different 
meanings of changes and directions with regard of economic growth.  The attempt to be 
escaped by the required bilateral choice between capital and labor re-illuminates on 
alternative factors to research economic growth. 
The First Fundamental Law of Capitalism α = r × β 
With the aid of exploration of capital induced from national income, the first law of 
capitalism attempts to show visible motion of dynamics.  It requires the fully-fledged 
account of global data because the formula produces the global interpretation without 
constraints.  In the left side of formula, α can be added and in the right side of formula, r × β 
can be added.  Hence, broader context with global empirical data is somewhat limited.    
 
“In order to illustrate the difference between short-term and long-term movements of the capital/income 
ratio, it is useful to examine the annual changes observed in the wealthiest countries between 1970 and 2010, a 
period for which we have reliable and homogeneous data for a large number of countries.  To begin, here is a 
look at the ratio of private capital to national income, whose evolution is shown in Figure 5.3 for the eight richest 
countries in the world, in order of decreasing GDP: the United States, Japan, Germany, France, Britain, Italy, 
Canada, and Australia.” “ Figure 5.3 (figure 1 in the paper as below) displays annual series and shows that the 
capital/income ratio in all countries varied constantly in the very short run. ” 
 “…. can now present the first fundamental law of capitalism, which links the capital stock to the flow of 
income from capital.  The capital/income ratio β is related in a simple way to the share of income from capital 
in national income, denoted α. The formula is α = r × β, where r is the rate of return on capital. …” 
Ref: Thomas Piketty (2014) Capital in the Twenty-First Century 
 
The first law of capitalism offers a subjective view of capital to focus on deviation of 
bilateral choice between capital and labor.  Further evidence of the authenticity of the text is 
needed. 
In the figure 1 (as below), the slope is upward in the end. It implies interpretation 
whether long-run or short-run economy is possible.  However, depending on the date of the 
World Bank as below, it’s impossible to explain about capital formation except for data of 
China.  China has the highest gross capital formation (% of gross domestic production 
(GDP)) from 2004 to 2013.  Indeed, this level is higher than the world’s one.  France, 
Germany, United States and Japan’s graphs are similar except for China’s one. 
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                                  Ref: piketty.pse.ens.fr/capital21c 
Figure 1 : Private Capital in Rich Countries, 1970-2010 
In the figure 2 (as below), gross capital formation (formerly gross domestic investment) 
consists of outlays on additions to the fixed assets of the economy plus net changes in the 
level of inventories.  Fixed assets include land improvements (fences, ditches, drains, and so 
on); plant, machinery, and equipment purchases; and the construction of roads, railways, and 
the like, including schools, offices, hospitals, private residential dwellings, and commercial 
and industrial buildings. Inventories are stocks of goods held by firms to meet temporary or 
unexpected fluctuations in production or sales, and "work in progress."  According to the 
1993 SNA, net acquisitions of valuables are also considered capital formation. 
  
               
Ref : World Bank national accounts data and OECD National Accounts data files, May, 2014 
Figure 2 : Gross Capital Formation (% of gross domestic production (GDP)) 
The first law of capitalism gives fresh impetus to emphasize the role of capital to promote 
economic growth.  It should be elaborated to describe the main features of dynamics related 
to global data for the possibility of wide cross-country comparison. 
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The Second Fundamental Law of Capitalism: β = s / g 
“….In the long run, the capital/income ratio β is related in a simple and transparent way to the 
savings rate s and the growth rate g according to the following formula: β = s / g…..” 
Ref: Thomas Piketty (2014) Capital in the Twenty-First Century. 
Gauging the general applicability related to the income rate to the growth rate is investigated 
by similarity between each gross domestic production (GDP) motion of different countries 
and world average motion.   
As below, there are graphs of correlation between countries’ gross domestic production 
(GDP) growths and the world’s one.  China has very different shapes of correlation with 
respect to the world’s one from other’s.  This example is to test the hypothesis of the second 
law of capitalism.  With the panoramic viewpoint of figure 3, the argument is evidently to 
make explicit cross-sectional data of different countries and thus contrast various 
interpretations upon which to different approaches to the contemporary management of past 
built environments are based. 
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  Ref: author, 2014 
Figure 3 : Graphs of Correlation between Countries’ gross domestic production (GDP) Growths and the World’s 
One 
Gross domestic production (GDP) growth graphs of United Kingdom, United States, France, 
Germany, Japan, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain have similar upward tendencies.  China’s 
one looks like South Korea, Mexico, Argentina, Brazil and Chile.    
In addition, in the long run, can the capital/income ratio β be reflected by the volatility of 
the savings rate s and the growth rate g?  Within the context not to divide into countries 
depending on their economic sizes, then, we face aggregation problem.  This brief empirical 
test here is intended to provoke the case that outstanding values than averaged value in the 
long run can exist.  The second law of capitalism encapsulates the capital concern in general.  
However, it initiates a discussion of the stabilization of dynamics and boundary of optimal 
values by the end.  Hence, in this paper, I will endeavor to explore new variables which can 
affect the left side and right side in the law of capitalism by absorption.  
Economic Size and Debt Sustainability 
Trade condition  
Judging from stability of the capital-labor split, in the paper, attention was directed to 
weightiness of capital and labor.  Two laws of Piketty’s capitalism have centered on the 
capital inequality within national income.  The main objective of arguments is to investigate 
the validity of global application because an idea of capital inequality takes economic growth 
as the focal point.  In what follows, I explore key signifying variables.  I hope to look most 
closely at familiar economic variables from a global angle.   
I shall start by an attempt to check the correlation between average value of world and 
each value of each country with regard to exports of goods and services, gross domestic 
production (GDP) growth, GDP per capital, gross national income (GNI) per capital 
purchasing power parity (PPP), Gross capital formation, Gross savings, foreign direct 
investment (FDI) and inflation consumer price.  What I propose to do here is to examine 
structural importance of key economic variables except for capital within world variables.  I 
will use these empirical data as a framework against which to understand the capital within 
national income.  I will concentrate on more rational way to address economic growth and 
capital inequality offering the global interpretation beyond the capital inequality framework 
within national income of Thomas Piketty.    
Depend on data of World Bank, from 1970 to 2013, the correlation between world’s one 
and countries’ exports of goods and services is positive. (Observation 43) 
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Table 3.1 : Correlation between World’s One and Countries’ Exports of Goods and Services 
 
 
From 1971 to 2012, among the correlation between world’s one and countries’ GDP growth, 
China and Argentine’s ones have negative values. (Observation 42)  
 
Table 3.2 : Correlation between World’s One and Countries’ GDP Growth 
  
From 1970 to 2013, the correlation between world’s one and countries’ GDP per capital is 
positive. (Observation 43)                                         
 
 
 
ECONOMIC SIZE AND DEBT SUSTAINABILITY AGAINST PIKETTY’S “CAPITAL INEQUALITY” 
 
30 
Table 3.3 : Correlation between World’s One and Countries’ GDP per Capital 
 
From 1980 to 2012, the correlation between world’s one and countries’ GNI per capital ppp is 
positive. (Observation 27)    
 
Table 3.4 : Correlation between World’s One and Countries’ GNI per Capital PPP 
 
 
From 1970 to 2013, the correlation between world’s one and countries’ gross capital 
formation is positive. (Observation 27)                            
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Table 3.5 : Correlation between World’s One and Countries’ Gross Capital Formation
 
 
From 1970 to 2012, the correlation between world’s one and countries’ gross savings have 
negative value. (Observation 14)                            
 
Table 3.6 : Correlation between World’s One and Countries’ Gross Savings 
 
From 1961 to 2013, the correlation between world’s one and countries’ inflation consumer 
prices have negative value. (Observation 3)     
 
ECONOMIC SIZE AND DEBT SUSTAINABILITY AGAINST PIKETTY’S “CAPITAL INEQUALITY” 
 
32 
Table 3.8 : Correlation between World’s One and Countries’ Inflation Consumer Prices 
 
From 1970 to 2012, the correlation between world’s one and countries’ FDI is no observation. 
 
Table 3.7 : Correlation between World’s One and Countries’ FDI – no observation 
 
Among the correlation with the world’s one, exports of goods and services, GDP per capital 
and gross capital formation have positive correlation value.  This is the reason why we need 
to focus on trade condition beyond no trade condition and complete market condition.  The 
attempt to identify the law of capitalism by Thomas Piketty draws together the bulk of the 
published neoclassical papers mainstreamed by French Economists.  I wish to flesh this out 
to take a highly microscopic approach to the question of economic growth.  I begin with a 
case analysis of Latin America animated by a curiosity about impact of export and debt 
problematizing sovereign credit to affect the sustainability of each country and the whole 
economy in general.     
To deal with the global framework of capital inequality and economic growth, I turn to 
state export and debt sustainability in a series of ratio analysis of Thomas Piketty. I may say 
that capital inequality within national income will be articulated with ideas about external 
debt to export.  Having discussed empirical data, it is now time to focus on global activities 
beyond the domestic activities concerning sustainability of economic society. 
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Export and Debt sustainability 
In case of debt sustainability, the debt to export criterion should be considered with the size of 
countries. (Roubini, N. 2001)  Suppose you have two countries, A and B are identical. Their 
GDP is 100 each, their external debt is 50 each and their export is 20 each.  Then the debt to 
GDP ratio is 50% for each and the debt to export ratio is 250% each.  Assume that, at this 
ratio, both countries are solvent.  Now take two countries and merge them.  Total GDP will 
be 200, total debt will be 100 and total exports will be 20.  Roubini, N. (2001) mentioned 
this is because exports among each other are now inter-regional rather than internationally 
tradable.  At this point, the economic problem might be put with trade in a sense of the full 
context of framework considering the economic size.  
By the end of this case, the combined A+B economy has a debt to GDP ratio that is still 
50% but now the debt to export ratio is 500%, a figure concludes on a pessimistic note.    In 
the light of the debt to export criterion, two economies are solvent if they are considered as 
two. On the contrary, they are insolvent if they are combined.  This suggests that the debt to 
export ratio may be a faulty measure for solvency of larger countries; it suffices to say that 
“large” implies intra-regional rather than internationally tradable.  Significantly, smaller 
countries with similar fundamental condition would look solvent just because their export to 
GDP ratio is higher than larger ones.  
To put it more concretely, a small and opened economy, like Argentina, is usually more 
opener than a larger economy.  It is lowly probable to say that the big economy, like Brazil, 
low export to GDP ratio undoubtedly reflect currency overvaluation, high degrees of trade 
protection and other policy restrictions to openness rather than the structure on the whole 
about lower openness.  By the same token, the economy having a large debt to export ratio 
needs openness to service its external debt.  For example, if export ratios are low, even a 
large real depreciation may not improve exports and trade balance enough to reduce a 
resource (trade balance) gap necessary to prevent insolvency so the degree of openness 
(export to GDP ratio) within countries or beyond countries does affect country’s ability to 
service its debt.  
As below, through the dickey fuller test - examines whether a unit root is presented or not 
in an autoregressive model, validity of variables can be detected more.  These data arranged 
yearly from 1970 to 2012 can be distinguished whether it has a unit root. The feature of 
processes can prevent serious statistical drawback at the beginning.  
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Table 4 : Validity of Detectable Variables Checked by the Dickey Fuller Test 
dickey fuller test p-value Mexicogniperc 0.298 
Worldinfconsumerp 0.3432 Argentinagniperc 0.3281 
Chinainfconsumerp 0.0997 Brazilgniperc 0.3169 
United Kingdominfconsumerp 0.0351 Chilegniperc 0.267 
United Statesinfconsumerp 0.0279 Greecegniperc 0.0641 
Franceinfconsumerp 0.046 Irelandgniperc 0.2209 
Germanyinfconsumerp 0.0676 Italygniperc 0.0459 
Japaninfconsumerp 0.241 Portugalgniperc 0.5748 
Korea, Rep.infconsumerp 0.0657 Spaingniperc 0.115 
Mexicoinfconsumerp 0.0459 Worldgdpperc 0.5265 
Argentinainfconsumerp 0.0061 Chinagdpperc 0.1349 
Brazilinfconsumerp 0.1299 United Kingdomgdpperc 0.0888 
Chileinfconsumerp 0.4592 United Statesgdpperc 0.0062 
Greeceinfconsumerp 0.5022 Francegdpperc 0.3853 
Irelandinfconsumerp 0.3117 Germanygdpperc 0.5728 
Italyinfconsumerp 0 Japangdpperc 0.1964 
Portugalinfconsumerp 0.3045 Korea, Rep.gdpperc 0.0356 
Spaininfconsumerp 0.2629 Mexicogdpperc 0.298 
Worldgsaving 0.4606 Argentinagdpperc 0.2843 
Chinagsaving 0.7955 Brazilgdpperc 0.3086 
United Kingdomgsaving 0.2142 Chilegdpperc 0.267 
United Statesgsaving 0.0053 Greecegdpperc 0.0641 
Francegsaving 0.099 Irelandgdpperc 0.2209 
Germanygsaving 0.2228 Italygdpperc 0.0459 
Japangsaving 0.4214 Portugalgdpperc 0.0484 
Korea, Rep.gsaving 0.1076 Spaingdpperc 0.0193 
Mexicogsaving 0.014 Worldgdpg 0.0031 
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Argentinagsaving 0.0041 Chinagdpg 0 
Brazilgsaving 0.0093 United Kingdomgdpg 0.0023 
Chilegsaving 0.0009 United Statesgdpg 0.0104 
Greecegsaving 0.0184 Francegdpg 0.0234 
Irelandgsaving 0.0006 Germanygdpg 0.227 
Italygsaving 0 Japangdpg 0.0099 
Portugalgsaving 0.0619 Korea, Rep.gdpg 0.0125 
Spaingsaving 0 Mexicogdpg 0.0041 
Worldgcf 0 Argentinagdpg 0 
Chinagcf 0.6332 Brazilgdpg 0.017 
United Kingdomgcf 0.0827 Chilegdpg 0.1073 
United Statesgcf 0.0176 Greecegdpg 0 
Francegcf 0.0507 Irelandgdpg 0.0034 
Germanygcf 0.0006 Italygdpg 0.1602 
Japangcf 0.0001 Portugalgdpg 0.2253 
Korea, Rep.gcf 0.0004 Spaingdpg 0 
Mexicogcf 0.0058 Worldexp 0.0245 
Argentinagcf 0 Chinaexp 0.162 
Brazilgcf 0.0089 United Kingdomexp 0.0108 
Chilegcf 0.1748 United Statesexp 0.0038 
Greecegcf 0.2375 Franceexp 0.1233 
Irelandgcf 0.0319 Germanyexp 0.0557 
Italygcf 0.0095 Japanexp 0 
Portugalgcf 0.1592 Korea, Rep.exp 0.0023 
Spaingcf 0.332 Mexicoexp 0.081 
Worldgniperc 0.7192 Argentinaexp 0.0479 
Chinagniperc 0.768 Brazilexp 0.073 
United Kingdomgniperc 0.3285 Chileexp 0.3792 
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United Statesgniperc 0.0176 Greeceexp 0.6203 
Francegniperc 0.3853 Irelandexp 0.5382 
Germanygniperc 0.3763 Italyexp 0.5295 
Japangniperc 0.1964 Portugalexp 0.4947 
Korea, Rep.gniperc 0.0049 Spainexp no obs 
 
Ref : author made by the Dickey fuller test of countries’ variables extracted from the World 
Bank, 2014 
infconsumerp= inflation consumer prices, gsaving=gross savings, gcf=gross capital formation, 
gniperc=gni per capital ppp, gdpperc=gdp per capita, gdpg=gdp growth, exp=exports of 
goods and services 
 
A clear understanding of empirical data about economic data requires reliability of raw data.  
In supporting the assumption that export and debt sustainability are keys to get to the heart of 
questions relating to the economic growth, I mentioned them with the empirical angle because 
it provides the necessary background for discussing capital to GDP and further GDP analysis 
related to capital inequality. 
Debt management of Latin America 
Debt-driven capital 
In the 1960s and 1970s, Latin American countries, notably Brazil, Argentina, and Mexico, 
borrowed huge sums of money from international creditors for industrialization; especially 
infrastructure programs.  After 1973, private banks had an influx of funds from oil-rich 
countries and believed that sovereign debt was a safe investment.  Between 1975 and 1982, 
Latin American debt to commercial banks increased at a cumulative annual rate of 20.4 
percent. This heightened borrowing led Latin America to quadruple its external debt from $75 
billion in 1975 to more than $315 billion in 1983, or 50 percent of the region's gross domestic 
product (GDP). Debt service (interest payments and the repayment of principal) grew even 
faster, reaching $66 billion in 1982, up from $12 billion in 1975. 
Failure of debt-driven capital 
As interest rates increased in the United States of America and in Europe in 1979, debt 
payments also increased, making it harder for borrowing countries to pay back their debts.  
Deterioration in the exchange rate with the US dollar meant that Latin American governments 
ended up owing tremendous quantities of their national currencies, as well as losing 
purchasing power.  The contraction of world trade in 1981 caused the prices of primary 
resources (Latin America's largest export) to fall. 
Argentina has until midnight on July 30, 2014 to avoid going into default for eight times 
in its history.  Most creditors exchanged their defaulted debt for new securities in two 
restructurings in 2005 and 2010 but a few creditors led by a hedge fund called NML Capital 
scooped up the cheap defaulted debt in order to chase payment of full principal plus interest.  
If Argentina defaults, its outstanding debt under foreign law amounts will be $29 billion.   
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Why capital can not be simply explained within gross domestic production (GDP) : Attention 
to GDP replacing foreign imports – Import substitution industrialization (ISI) 
Import substitution industrialization (ISI) is a trade and economic policy that advocates 
replacing foreign imports with domestic production.  ISI policies were enacted by countries 
within the Global South with the intention of producing development and self-sufficiency 
through the creation of an internal market.  ISI works by having the state leading economic 
development through nationalization, subsidization of vital industries (including agriculture, 
power generation, etc.), increased taxation, and highly protectionist trade policies.  Import 
substitution industrialization was gradually abandoned by developing countries in the 1980s 
and 1990s due to structural indebtedness from ISI related policies on the insistence of the IMF 
and World Bank through their structural adjustment programs of market-driven liberalization 
aimed at the Global South.   
ISI was most successful in countries with large populations and income levels which 
allowed for the consumption of locally produced products. Latin American countries such as 
Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and (to a lesser extent) Chile, Uruguay and Venezuela, had the 
most success with ISI.  This is so because while the investment to produce cheap consumer 
products may pay off in a small consumer market, the same cannot be said for capital 
intensive industries, such as automobiles and heavy machinery, which depend on larger 
consumer markets to survive.  Thus, smaller and poorer countries, such as Ecuador, 
Honduras, and the Dominican Republic, could implement ISI only to a limited extent.  Peru 
implemented ISI in 1961, and the policy lasted through to the end of the decade in some 
forms. 
By the early 1960s, domestic industry supplied 95% of Mexico’s and 98% of Brazil’s 
consumer goods.  Between 1950 and 1980, Latin America’s industrial output went up six 
times, keeping well ahead of population growth. Infant mortality fell from 107 per 1,000 live 
births in 1960 to 69 per 1,000 in 1980 and life expectancy rose from 52 to 64 years. In the mid 
of 1950s, Latin America’s economies were growing faster than those of the industrialized 
West. 
More to the immediate point why the GDP is not just the GDP to consider the capital 
inequality: example of Export-oriented industrialization (EOI) 
Export-oriented industrialization (EOI) sometimes called export substitution industrialization 
(ESI), export led industrialization (ELI) or export-led growth is a trade and economic policy 
aiming to speed up the industrialization process of a country by exporting goods for which the 
nation has a comparative advantage. 
From the Great Depression to the years after World War II, under-developed and 
developing countries started to have the hard time economically.  During this time, many 
foreign markets were closed and the danger of trading and shipping in war-time waters drove 
many of these countries to look for another solution to development.  The initial solution to 
this dilemma was called import substitution industrialization. 
Both Latin American and Asian countries used this strategy at first. However, during the 
1950s and 1960s, Asian countries, like Taiwan and South Korea, started focusing their 
development outward, resulting in an export-led growth strategy.  Most of Latin American 
countries continued with import substitution industrialization, just expanding their scopes. 
Some have pointed that out because of the success of Asian countries, especially Taiwan and 
South Korea. 
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Insolvent external debt of Latin America 
Since the 1980 several countries in the region have experienced a surge in economic 
development and have initiated debt management programs in addition to debt relief and debt 
rescheduling programs agreed to by their international creditors.  The following is a list of 
external debt for Latin America based on a 2012 report by The World Factbook. 
 
Table 5 External Debt for Latin America 
Rank Country – Entity 
External Debt 
(million US$) 
Date of information 
26 Brazil 405,300 31 December 2012. 
35 Argentina 130,200 31 December 2012. 
40 Mexico 125,700 31 December 2012 
45 Chile 102,100 31 December 2012. 
49 Colombia 73,410 31 December 2012. 
51 Venezuela 63,740 31 December 2012. 
63 Peru 4,200 31 December 2012. 
77 Cuba 22,160 31 December 2012. 
78 Ecuador 20,030 31 December 2012. 
81 Dominican Republic 16,580 31 December 2012. 
82 Guatemala 16,170 31 December 2012. 
83 Uruguay 15,900 31 December 2012. 
85 Panama 14,200 31 December 2012. 
86 El Salvador 12,840 31 December 2012. 
88 Costa Rica 12,040 31 December 2012. 
112 Nicaragua 5,228 31 December 2012. 
114 Honduras 4,884 31 December 2012. 
123 Bolivia 4,200 31 December 2012. 
139 Paraguay 2,245 31 December 2012. 
Ref: author, 2014 
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Openness and External debt to exports ratio 
Debt burden indicators include the (a) Debt to gross domestic production (GDP) ratio, (b) 
External debt to exports ratio, (c) Government debt to current fiscal revenue ratio etc. This set 
of indicators also covers the structure of the outstanding debt including the (d) Share of 
foreign debt, (e) Short-term debt, and (f) Concessional debt in the total debt stock.
 
 
 
Table 6 : External Debt to Exports Ratio 
Country - Entity 
(million$)  
external debt exports Ratio (External debt/Exports) 
Brazil 405,300 242,000 1.674793388 
Argentina 130,200 85,360 1.525304592 
Mexico 125,700 370,900 0.338905365 
Chile 102,100 83,660 1.220415969 
Colombia 73,410 59,960 1.224316211 
Venezuela 63,740 96,900 0.657791538 
Peru 4,200 47,380 0.088644998 
Cuba 22,160 5,600 3.957142857 
Ecuador 20,030 23,770 0.842658814 
Dominican 
Republic 
16,580 9,467 1.751346784 
Guatemala 16,170 9,864 1.639294404 
Uruguay 15,900 9,812 1.620464737 
Panama 14,200 17,970 0.790205899 
El Salvador 12,840 5,804 2.212267402 
Costa Rica 12,040 11,470 1.049694856 
Nicaragua 5,228 4,160 1.256730769 
Honduras 4,884 6,946 0.703138497 
Bolivia 4,200 11,770 0.356839422 
Paraguay 2,245 4,700 0.477659574 
Ref: world fact book, 2012 
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The ratio of gross external debt to exports provides a quick indicator of the capability of an 
economy to repay external debt with enhanced revenue from sales to foreign countries.  A 
ratio below 1 suggests that debt can be repaid rapidly, theoretically in less than one year.  
Conversely, the higher the ratio is the lower the country’s capability to finance the debt with 
revenue from exports. 
Having discussed the capital inequality issue, attention to the export variable and need of 
comprehensive ratio analysis: debt to export ratio and capital to income ratio, we will now 
proceed to investigate the risk management status of Latin America. 
Risk management in major Latin America countries: (Mexico, Argentina, Brazil, Chile) 
Among Latin America, the adoption of solvency II which is EU directive - codifies and 
harmonizes the EU insurance regulation primary concerning the amount of capital that EU 
insurance companies must hold to reduce the risk of insolvency- is realistic in Mexico.  In 
the second half of 2008, the Mexican regulator (Comisión Nacional de Seguros y Fianzas, or 
CNSF) shared with the Mexican association of insurance companies (Asociación Mexicana de 
Instituciones de Seguros, or AMIS) a draft of a project of insurance law (the proposed law) in 
which a Solvency II-type regime was incorporated.  The draft considered an initial date for 
this proposed law of January 2012.  Since that time (end of 2008) through 2009 and the 
beginning of 2010, the proposed law was discussed and reviewed between CNSF and AMIS.  
The actual initial date is January 2014.  However, the proposed law did not approved by the 
Mexican Congress. 
    If the strong solvency regulation is existed like Argentina, the conflict of two 
regulations between local solvency regulation and international one should be considered for 
the stable adoption.  The current framework does not seem to indicate that an extended 
application of the Solvency II methodology will be feasible in the near future, except for 
offices and branches of European–based insurance companies.  
The regulatory agency, SSN (Superintendencia de Seguros de la Nación) only mentioned 
the adoption of Solvency II without clear criteria.  Actually, the insurance industry is tightly 
regulated in Argentina.  SSN resolutions cover most aspects of insurance company activities, 
including unearned premiums and methods of mathematical reserve valuation.  The agency 
establishes minimum valuation methods arising from formulas used to value out-of-court, 
mediation and lawsuit payables, as well as incurred but not reported (IBNR) claims reserves.  
Most insurance companies use these mechanisms to value their payables.  As of 30 June 
2011 (last fiscal year-end), all insurance companies in the market calculated their capital to be 
credited based on the issued premiums indicator.  Of 155 insurers, only 4 carried minimum 
capital deficit as of this date.  In recent months, the SSN announced the launch of a strategic 
plan of insurance, inviting all industry participants to bring their vision to define the insurance 
policy to be used during the period 2012–2020.  
The existence of many solvency regulations can be analyzed with the conflict inside rules 
in Brazil so the Own Risk and Solvency Assessment (ORSA) is needed to integrate them.  
Brazil has adopted international regulations at each pillar.  For Pillar I, the adoption of 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) as Brazilian generally accepted 
accounting principles (GAAP) in 2010.  Detailed monthly reporting requirements of 
individual policy and claims data for the Insurance Supervisory Authority (Superintendência 
de Seguros Privados, SUSEP) were introduced in 2004 at the level of Pillar II.  In 2004, the 
Supervisory Authority introduced the requirement that each insurance company should 
produce an annual actuarial valuation report proper to Pillar III.  
In Chile, a new law that would require insurance companies to withhold risk-based 
capital was sent to Congress for approval on 30 September 2011.  The methodology for 
calculating risk-based capital in Chile has yet to be made public.  It is expected that the 
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Chilean regulator will publish a consultative white paper with details around the calculation of 
risk-based capital in the third quarter of 2012.  The SVS (Superintendencia de Valores y 
Seguros) has demonstrated interest in performing the first Quantitative Impact Study (QIS) by 
the end of 2012.  
Conclusion 
A capital-labor split of Cobb-Douglas function which continues to be widely used by 
economists, has little empirical support.  Even though neo-classical economists have 
proposed mathematical and theoretical realisms of economic growth by using the function, it 
was never empirically validated as the appropriate model for economic growth.  Indeed, 
Thomas Piketty, a French economist, brought up this debated topic about capital inequality in 
his book, Capital in the Twenty-First Century in 2014. 
I agree with him in that there is the structure of inequality with respect to both labor and 
capital actually changed since the ninetieth century of the chapter: Beyond Cobb-Douglas 
“The Question of the Stability of the Capital-Labor Split.  Some research questions like “Did 
the Increase of inequality cause the financial crisis?”, “The illusion of marginal productivity”, 
“The Question of Time Preference” and “Is there an equilibrium distribution?” are fresh and 
fancy to break old fixed ideas. 
I feel the solution is weak to support his brilliant idea enoughly.  At the part4, the talk is 
suddenly changed to tax and pension (PAYGOs) without connection with previous capital 
inequality.  Tax issues on Capital and Chinese millionaires are far from the real data of 
capital formation because it is very high value in China.  We cannot see any empirical data 
of China’s one in his book even though the major capital part is by China.  It seems hard to 
accept a solution of redistribution by immigration and an opinion about the central bank just 
as a loan deal before redistribution of wealth.  
In the article, the most recent data shows that export and external debt may be correlated 
to explain economy growth.  In the paper, Latin America history pervades the claim that 
capital within GDP of Thomas Piketty should be enhanced by conceptual capital related to 
debt and export beyond GDP.  In addition, to point out miscalculation of ratio analysis 
depending on economic size, the example by Roubini, N. (2001) is demonstrated.  To 
conclude, through the case analysis of Latin America, in detail, economic size and debt 
sustainability as economic growth indicators are emphasized by empirical data. 
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